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Abstract
Recently, assessments have robustly linked stabilization of global-mean temperature rise to the
necessity of limiting the total amount of emitted carbon-dioxide (CO2). Halting global warming thus
requires virtually zero annual CO2 emissions at some point. Policymakers have now incorporated this
concept in the negotiating text for a new global climate agreement, but confusion remains about
concepts like carbon neutrality, climate neutrality, full decarbonization, and net zero carbon or net
zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.Here we clarify these concepts, discuss their appropriateness to
serve as a long-term global benchmark for achieving temperature targets, and provide a detailed
quantiﬁcation.We ﬁnd that with current pledges and for a likely (>66%) chance of staying below 2 °C,
the scenario literature suggests net zeroCO2 emissions between 2060 and 2070, with net negative CO2
emissions thereafter. Because of residual non-CO2 emissions, net zero is always reached later for total
GHGemissions than forCO2.Net zero emissions targets are a useful focal point for policy, linking a
global temperature target and socio-economic pathways to a necessary long-term limit on cumulative
CO2 emissions.
1. Introduction
Global-mean temperature rise is to ﬁrst order propor-
tional to the cumulative amount of CO2 emitted into
the atmosphere. This emerging characteristic of the
Earth System has now been widely studied (Allen
et al 2009, Matthews et al 2009, Meinshausen
et al 2009) and robustly assessed (Collins et al 2013,
IPCC 2013). There are several direct implications of
this proportionality (Knutti andRogelj 2015), towhich
also the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) already alludes (Collins et al 2013, IPCC 2013,
Stocker et al 2013, IPCC 2014a, Clarke et al 2014). For
instance, any given level of temperature stabilization is
associated with an upper bound on cumulative CO2
emissions (IPCC 2013), sometimes termed a carbon
budget or quota. Therefore, higher emissions in earlier
decades imply lower emissions by the same amount
later (Collins et al 2013, IPCC 2013). The proportion-
ality between CO2 and global-mean temperature also
implies that limiting warming to any level requires
annual net CO2 emissions to be phased out to virtually
zero (Matthews and Caldeira 2008), at the latest near
the time when temperature stabilization is to be
achieved (Matthews and Caldeira 2008, Ricke and
Caldeira 2014, Zickfeld and Herrington 2015). Based
on an assessment of scenarios that take into account
possible evolutions of our global society (Clarke
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et al 2014), the IPCC Synthesis Report ﬁnds that to
keep warming to below 2 °C with a likely (>66%)
chance, such pathways would require cumulative
emissions to be limited to around 1000 GtCO2 after
2011 with near-zero long-lived greenhouse gases
(GHG) by the end of the century (IPCC 2014a). Limit-
ing warming to lower or higher levels would involve
similar challenges but on different timescales
(IPCC 2014a). With the publication—in 2013 and
2014—of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the
IPCC, these insights have now become widely
disseminated.
A further contribution to this dissemination was
made by the UNEP Emissions Gap Report
(UNEP 2014). In its 2014 edition, the UNEP Emis-
sions Gap Report started from the IPCC AR5 ﬁndings
on carbon budgets and explored how these emissions
can be spread out over time, and when global carbon
neutrality should be achieved (see further below).
Because of the authoritative character and the high
visibility of these scientiﬁc assessments, these insights
were quickly taken up by policymakers. For instance,
they have found their way into the text which forms
the basis for negotiation of a new global climate agree-
ment under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2015). Many text
proposals suggest setting a long-term global goal in
terms of a timeline for achieving global net zero emis-
sions. Such long-term global net zero goals can guide
policymakers in their choice of near-term mitigation
actions. Governments, businesses and investors
invests in projects today that can last 50 years and
more. An aspirational end point for CO2 emissions
can catalyse and facilitate choices that enable the
required long-term transition to net zero carbon
emissions.
However, the available UNFCCC text proposals
also show that the precisemeaning and applicability of
concepts related to zero (carbon) emissions remain
unclear. Indeed, a structured overview of these con-
cepts is currently not available, and neither is a detailed
quantiﬁcation of their link to global temperature lim-
its like 1.5 °C and 2 °C.We here ﬁll this science-policy
gap and discuss the strengths and limitations of var-
ious zero-emission concepts like carbon neutrality,
full decarbonization, climate neutrality, (net) zero car-
bon emissions, and (net) zero GHG emissions. Addi-
tionally, we quantify their link to currently discussed
global temperature objectives.
2.Different interpretations of zero
We ﬁrst provide an overview and working deﬁnitions
of different zero-emission concepts. Table 1 provides
formulas for all deﬁnitions introduced below. Note
that the terms carbon and CO2 are used
interchangeably.
Historically, the term decarbonization has been
used to denote the declining average carbon intensity
of primary energy production over time (Fisher
et al 2007), or, more generally, the reduction of carbon
emissions from energy and industrial processes
(Clarke et al 2014). Here, we keep this interpretation.
Full decarbonization of the global economy thus
means that annual unabated CO2 emissions from
energy and industrial processes are zero on the global
scale. Unabated CO2 emissions here refer to CO2
emissions from energy and industrial activities that are
not balanced by CO2 sequestration by means of car-
bon capture and geological storage (CCS; see table 1).
The G7 recently included this terminology in its sum-
mit declaration (G7 2015). The G7 statement of dec-
arbonization ‘over the course of the century’ can be
regarded as the process of decarbonization with full
decarbonization as its end point, towards the end of the
century.
Similarly, carbon neutrality of the global economy
denotes that total annual CO2 emissions are zero on
the global scale. This concept thus covers all anthro-
pogenic sources of CO2, including energy, industrial,
Table 1.Overview of emission deﬁnitions and zero-emission
concepts.
Emission deﬁnitions
EIC CCS= -
E: Annual CO2 generation by energy and industrial processes
CCS: Annual capture and geological storage of CO2
IC: Annual unabatedCO2 emissions from energy and industrial
processes
E FFC BFC IA BFU= + + -
FFC: Annual CO2 generation from combustion of fossil fuels
(before application of CCS)
BFC: Annual CO2 generation from combustion of biofuels
(before application of CCS)
IA: Annual CO2 generation from industrial activities (for exam-
ple, cement production)
BFU: Annual CO2 uptake during biofuel production
NC IC LS LR= + -
LS: Annual CO2 emissions due to land use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF)
LR: Annual CO2 uptake/removals due to LULUCF (excluding
biofuel production, BFU)
NC: Annual net CO2 emissions
NGHG NC EGHG= +
EGHG:Annual emissions of non-CO2Kyoto-GHGs inCO2-
equivalence
NGHG: Annual net Kyoto-GHG emissions
Zero-emission concepts
Full decarbonization or reducing net CO2 emissions from energy and
industrial processes (after accounting for CCS) to zero:
IC 0=
Carbon neutrality or net zero CO2 emissions:
NC 0=
Zero carbon emissions everywhere:
E 0; FFC 0; BFC 0; IA 0; LS 0= = = = =
Climate neutrality or net GHG emissions:
NGHG 0=
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and land-use emissions. Carbon neutrality can be used
as a synonym for the scientiﬁc term net zero carbon
emissions: for every remaining ton of CO2 emitted due
to human activities, exactly one ton of CO2 is actively
removed from the atmosphere due to (other) human
activities.
Zero carbon emissions (without the net qualiﬁer) is
a more hypothetical concept. This goal—when
applied to each possible emission sector (ActionAid
et al 2015) (table 1)—cannot be derived from the IPCC
assessment or the current scenario literature (Clarke
et al 2014). Not a single scenario in the IPCC scenario
database (methods) achieves zero carbon emissions
everywhere, as even in the most extreme mitigation
scenarios residual CO2 emissions from, e.g., the trans-
port sector can be found. More fundamentally, it
seems unlikely that human systems, including the
land-use system, can be reduced to zero emissions
everywhere. For instance, the cutting and burning of a
single tree produces anthropogenic carbon emissions.
Neither carbon neutrality (i.e., net zero carbon
emissions), nor full decarbonization imply zero emis-
sions everywhere or in all sectors. Moreover, carbon
neutrality also does not imply full decarbonization, as
remaining energy and industry-related emissions
could be compensated by CO2 removals achieved by
afforestation and reforestation. Finally, also full dec-
arbonization can still imply a remainder of gross emis-
sions from energy and industry, as long as negative
emissions (e.g. biomass use combined with CCS—
BECCS) compensate for this.
Climate neutrality can be interpreted in many
ways. It was introduced more than a decade ago (see
description in Worth 2005) and further disseminated
by UNEP (UNEP 2008, 2011). At a global scale it has
been deﬁned as ‘living in a way which produces no net
GHG emissions’ (UNEP 2008). In scientiﬁc terms this
hence corresponds to achieving net zero GHG emis-
sions. In the scientiﬁc literature (UNEP 2014), net zero
global GHG emissions are taken as the point in which
total global Kyoto-GHG emissions (methods) become
net zero—which means that any residual CO2 and
non-CO2 emissions (for example, methane or nitrous
oxide; expressed in units of CO2 equivalence) are com-
pensated by negative emissions of CO2.
As for carbon emissions, zero GHG emissions (in
absence of the qualiﬁer net) would imply that no
anthropogenic GHG emissions would occur anywhere
—an implausible scenario given that for some parts of
the agricultural, grazing, and life-stock sectors only
low technical mitigation potentials have yet been iden-
tiﬁed (Smith et al 2014).
3. Conceptual clarity
Unfortunately, the scientiﬁc deﬁnitions provided in
the previous section do not eliminate all possible
sources of confusion.Misinterpretation is still possible
because (i) some of the concepts require further
speciﬁcations in addition to the deﬁnitions provided
above, (ii) other deﬁnitions can be imagined for the
same concept, or (iii) a particular concept has already a
common (non-scientiﬁc) use in policy circles which is
different from its purely scientiﬁc meaning. We here
clarify these possible sources of confusion.
Compared to concepts that focus solely on CO2,
including all GHGs comes with some complications.
First, the compelling logic of a ﬁnite budget strictly
applies only to CO2, not to non-CO2 gases. For any
temperature stabilization level, CO2 emissions have to
become net zero once the budget is exhausted. How-
ever, non-CO2 emissions (like biogenic methane or
nitrous oxide) could theoretically be continued for-
ever at stable, low levels. This is because those non-
CO2 gases have limited lifetimes, while carbon that is
released into the interconnected Earth system (com-
prising atmosphere, biosphere and oceans) will
increase atmospheric CO2 concentrations on time-
scales of at least millennia (Joos et al 2012). Second,
CO2-equivalence of non-CO2 emissions can be based
on a variety of metrics, the choice of which incorpo-
rates normative judgements about the trade-offs
between policy targets (Deuber et al 2013, Myhre
et al 2013). Most commonly, global-warming-poten-
tial-weighted emissions over a 100 year period (GWP-
100) are used—for example, within the UNFCCC
(2002)—but many other options are available (Fugle-
stvedt et al 2003,Myhre et al 2013).
Net zero emission targets have amore direct scien-
tiﬁc meaning than neutrality concepts. For example,
climate neutrality could also be deﬁned in a broader
sense, instead of only referring to Kyoto-GHG emis-
sions. Such a deﬁnition could account for all anthro-
pogenic inﬂuences, such as air pollutants and the
modiﬁcation of the Earth’s surface albedo due to
anthropogenic land-use changes (Brovkin et al 2013).
The spatial heterogeneity of short-lived forcers and
land-use patterns forfeits the possibility of a full spatial
climate neutrality—although it would be theoretically
possible at an annual and global average scale.
Finally, we indicated above that net zero carbon
emissions can be achieved by balancing any remaining
CO2 emissions by CO2 removals of exactly the same
amount. Scientiﬁcally, the terms CO2 removals and
so-called negative emissions (Obersteiner et al 2001,
Ciais et al 2013, Tavoni and Socolow 2013, Clarke
et al 2014) are synonymous with respect to what the
atmosphere sees. They are both anthropogenic in ori-
gin and therewith distinct from the natural carbon
uptake via the carbon cycle. However, they are con-
ceptually connected to fundamentally different activ-
ities when used in international climate negotiating
settings, because the term removals has already been
used earlier in the climate policy discourse to denote
something more speciﬁc: in the UNFCCC, CO2
removals refer to the uptake of CO2 due to human
activities in the land use, land-use change, and forestry
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sector (LULUCF, for example, see UNFCCC 2014).
Negative emissions, on the other hand, would refer to
technological solutions like bioenergy in combination
with CO2 capture and permanent geological storage
(BECCS; see section 6.5 in Ciais et al 2013 and section
6.9 in Clarke et al 2014 for a longer discussion of nega-
tive emissions). Up to now, emission accounting
within the UNFCCC was focussed on historical and
near-term GHG emissions and LULUCF removals. In
this context, geological CCS and negative emissions
achieved by BECCS did not play a role. The prove-
nance and permanence of CO2 removals and negative
emissions can thus be interpreted very differently in the
context of international negotiations.
Furthermore, the term net emissions is also com-
monly used in submissions by countries to the
UNFCCC, although it remains legally undeﬁned. In
this setting, the term net is used to refer to the sum of
energy and industry-related emissions (referred to as
gross emissions) and emissions and removals from the
LULUCF sector. Finally, it is also used in the context of
national emission inventories when accounting for the
transfer and/or acquisition of international emission
trading units of one kind or another.
Therefore, care needs to be taken when using the
terms net or removals, because quite different implica-
tions for policy could be inferred by non-scientists.
While ‘net’ emission concepts mostly look at the bal-
ance of emissions across the complete range of sectors,
this does not exclusively need to be the case. For exam-
ple, full decarbonization considers the net outcome of
positive and negative emissions across the energy and
industry sectors only. In this case, remaining emis-
sions from some energy-related sources, e.g. the trans-
port sector, can be offset by BECCS power plants in the
electricity sector.
4.Methods
We re-analyse the scenarios of the IPCC AR5 Scenario
Database (hosted at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis and available at https://
secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AR5DB/), comple-
mented with scenarios from three studies (Luderer
et al 2013, Rogelj et al 2013a, 2013b) that additionally
explored scenarios that return warming to below
1.5 °C in 2100, as assessed in Rogelj et al (2015). These
scenarios are generated with process-detailed inte-
grated assessment models, which represent the com-
plex interaction between the energy, economy, and
land-use systems to derive cost-effective emission
pathways for prescribed climate change mitigation
targets. They do not account for the damages from
climate change. In most cases, the scenarios assume
globally coordinated mitigation action from a certain
year onward, for example, starting in 2010 or in 2030,
or after a transitional phase of fragmented climate
action. Besides the stringency of mitigation action,
scenarios also vary the availability of mitigation
technologies (for example, future availability of
nuclear energy or the maximum bio-energy potential)
or the assumed future energy demand.
Temperature outcomes were computed with the
reduced complexity carbon-cycle and climate model
MAGICC (Meinshausen et al 2011) in a probabilistic
setup (Meinshausen et al 2009, Rogelj et al 2012) con-
sistent with the IPCC AR5 climate sensitivity assess-
ment (Rogelj et al 2014).
The IPCC AR5 Scenario Database does not sample
cumulative carbon budgets evenly (ﬁgure 1(a)). This is
because the database was to a large extent populated by
the scenarios resulting from large model-inter-
comparison projects that all explored very similar for-
cing or cumulative emissions targets. These targets
were very often in line with limiting warming to below
2 °C. Therefore, the IPCC Scenario Database is parti-
cularly useful for exploring question regarding the
2 °C limit, but potentially less useful for other—both
higher and lower—limits.
Smoothing spline quantile regressions are com-
puted by ﬁrst applying a moving window over the
dataset and calculating the quantile values per win-
dow. Subsequently, a smoothing spline ﬁt was applied
to all calculated quantile points. Scenarios that do not
reach net zero CO2 emissions during the 21st century
are included in the percentiles, and are reported as
‘post-2100’. A jack-knife resampling was applied to
test the variance of our median estimates (Efron and
Stein 1981).
The Kyoto-basket (UNFCCC 1998) of GHGs
which we analyse from the scenarios contains CO2, as
well as methane (CH4), nitrous-oxide (N2O), hydro-
ﬂuorocarbons, perﬂuorinated compounds, and sul-
phur-hexaﬂuoride (SF6). In this study, we use 100 year
GWPs as provided in the IPCC Second Assessment
report to aggregate CO2 equivalent emissions of these
gases (although the climate model calculations are
independent from that metric, as concentrations and
forcings are calculated separately for each gas).
5.Global long-term emission goals
A limit on cumulative CO2 emissions is required to
halt global-mean temperature rise to any level and
hence implies that annual global CO2 emissions have
to become net zero at some point in time. We explore
the implications of this geophysical requirement by
means of a re-analysis of emission scenarios. First, we
explore the typical timing of annual CO2 emissions
reaching net zero levels as a function of cumulative
CO2 emissions in the 21st century (ﬁgure 1). Then, we
provide the characteristics of long-term zero emission
goals for global temperature objectives (ﬁgure 2) and
look at the effectiveness of carbon neutrality targets
(ﬁgure 3). Finally, we quantify the inﬂuence of higher
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Figure 1. Inﬂuence of peak year of global CO2 emissions on timing of net zero global CO2 emissions. (a)Distribution of cumulative
carbon emissions from2011 to 2100 and peak year for total global CO2 emissions. (b)Distribution of scenarios not achieving net zero
global CO2 emissions before in the 21st century. (c)Relationship between cumulative carbon emissions from2011 to 2100 and timing
of global CO2 emissions reaching net zero levels. Green, orange, purple, and pink colours in panel (b) and (c) refer to the peaking years
shown in panel (a). Dots indicate single scenarios. Diamonds showmedians, and box plots andwhiskers indicate the central 50 and
90% range, respectively, over each shaded bin. Empty diamonds indicate that less than 10 scenarios are available in a given bin and for
a given peaking year;ﬁlled diamonds indicate the opposite. Coloured boxes indicate thatmore than 80%of the scenarios actually
achieve net zeroCO2 emissions before 2100; grey boxes the opposite. Diagonal lines in panel (c) are smoothing splines over all data
points for each peaking year, respectively. Numbers in panel (c) areR2 values for the respective ﬁts.
Figure 2.Cumulative CO2 and net zero characteristics of 1.5 °Cand 2 °C scenarios. (a)Annual Kyoto-GHGemissions over time for
1.5 °Cand 2 °C scenarios (10th–90th percentile ranges). (b) Statistics of cumulative CO2 emissions from2011 to 2100 per scenario
group; (c) Statistics of timing of emissions becoming net zero.Data is provided for unabatedCO2 emissions from energy and industrial
sources, net total CO2 emissions, and net total Kyoto-GHG emissions. Percentages next to the bars in panel (c) indicate the share of
scenarios that do not achieve net zero levels before 2100 in the respective category and for the respective gas.
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or lower near-term emission levels (in 2020 and 2030)
on these zero emission goals (ﬁgures 4 and 5).
The IPCC (2014b) reported that scenarios having a
likely (>66%) chance to stay below 2 °C, limit cumu-
lative CO2 emissions to 630–1180 GtCO2 over the
2011–2100 period. Our scenario analysis suggests that
the vast majority of such scenarios would reach net
zero CO2 before about 2080 (ﬁgure 1, all years roun-
ded to the nearest 5). CO2 budgets are here deﬁned
over the 2011–2100 period, and about 155 GtCO2 was
emitted from 2011 to 2014 (Friedlingstein et al 2014,
LeQuéré et al 2014). Also for higher CO2 budgets of up
to about 1600GtCO2 net zero CO2 emissions are often
achieved before 2100, depending on the near-term
evolution of emissions (ﬁgure 1(c) and below).
To directly link these insights to temperature
objectives, we now use probabilistic temperature pro-
jections computed for each of the scenarios. This
Figure 3.Effectiveness of global carbon neutrality targets. Relationship between year of carbon neutrality and globalmean
temperature increase in 2100, relative to pre-industrial levels. Unless global carbon neutrality is achieved aroundmid-century, it
seems that achieving global carbon neutrality is a necessary, yet not a sufﬁcient, condition for limitingwarming to below 2 °Cby 2100
with at least 50% chance. Similar relationships for the timing of net global Kyoto-GHG emissions and of unabatedCO2 from energy
and industrial sources becoming zero is shown in supplementary ﬁgure S5.
Figure 4. Inﬂuence of near-term emission levels in 2020 and 2030 on timing of net zero global CO2 emissions during the 21st century.
Timing of net zero global CO2 emissions as a function of annual total CO2 (panel a) andKyoto-GHGs (panel b) emissions in 2020
(dots) and 2030 (diamonds), respectively. Black solid and dashed lines represent smoothing spline ﬁts for the years 2020 and 2030,
respectively. The encompassing grey and blue shaded ranges are smoothing spline quantile regressions onto the 10th and the 90th
percentile for the years 2020 and 2030, respectively. Dots and diamonds are colour-coded based on their probability of limiting
warming to below 2 °Cby 2100. All shown scenarios have cumulative CO2 emissions from2011 to 2100 between 930 and 1180
GtCO2.Numbers in the panels areR
2 values for the respectivemedian ﬁts.
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approach links temperature objectives to geophysical
constraints on cumulative CO2 emissions and techno-
logically feasible emission trajectories. Two tempera-
ture limits are currently the focus of the international
climate negotiations, a 1.5 °C and a 2 °C limit relative
to pre-industrial levels (see table 2 for precise deﬁni-
tions). Figure 2(a) shows that to stay below any of these
limits, important reductions in the annual emissions
of the aggregated Kyoto-GHGs are projected. With
CO2making up about three quarters of current Kyoto-
GHG emissions (Edenhofer et al 2014), this implies
that cumulative CO2 emissions over the 21st century
are capped at low levels.
We ﬁnd that to limit warming to below 2 °C with
at least 66% chance, median cumulative CO2 emis-
sions from 2011 to 2100 are 790 GtCO2, with an inter-
quartile range of 470–1085 GtCO2 (ﬁgure 2(b), table 2;
values rounded to the nearest 5 GtCO2). This range
compares well to the abovementioned IPCC range of
630–1180 GtCO2. Our median estimate is lower than
the IPCC range because our analysis includes studies
that explore more stringent mitigation targets
(Luderer et al 2013, Rogelj et al 2013a, 2013b, 2015)
than those included in the IPCC Scenario Database.
Finally, our results are also consistent with the 1000
GtCO2 value provided in the IPCC Synthesis Report
(IPCC 2014a). Supplementary text 1 provides a
detailed comparison. To return warming to below
1.5 °C by 2100, we ﬁnd a median CO2 budget of 365
GtCO2, and an interquartile range of 275–425GtCO2.
These budgets then translate into a corresponding
timing of achieving global net zero emissions
(ﬁgure 2(c); table 2). The median year of achieving net
zero CO2 emissions in scenarios which limit warming
to below 2 °Cwith>66% chance is around 2065, with
an interquartile range of approximately 2060–2075. In
more than 95%of the cases net zero CO2 emissions are
achieved before 2100. For Kyoto-GHG emissions,
median net zero levels are achieved around 2090 and
about two-thirds of the scenarios reach net zero
Kyoto-GHG levels before 2100. As negative emissions
technologies are only available for CO2, the timing of
net zero Kyoto-GHG emissions will always be later
than the timing of net zero CO2 emissions. Only when
CO2 emissions are already net negative on a global
scale, net zero Kyoto-GHG emissions will be achieved.
For 1.5 °C consistent scenarios both the timing of net
zero CO2 and Kyoto-GHGs is about a decade earlier.
These estimates are consistent with the UNEP Gap
Report (UNEP 2014) estimates, taking into account
differing assumptions about the near term (supple-
mentary text 1).
Because of the unstructured character of the IPCC
AR5 Scenario Database, the above-mentioned esti-
mates can be subject to sampling bias. Explicitly test-
ing for any model-sampling bias shows that the
median estimates reported in table 2 are surrounded
by an uncertainty that is of the order of the inter-
quartile or 5–95th percentile range for 2 °C and 1.5 °C,
respectively (see supplementary table 1). This reﬂects
the higher uncertainty surrounding the 1.5 °C related
estimates, because only two models provided scenar-
ios that fall within that category.
Figure 5. Inﬂuence of near-term (2030)Kyoto-GHG emission levels on timing of global CO2 emissions becoming net zero for 1.5 °C
and 2 °C scenarios. Year-2010 estimates and 90%uncertainty range are fromBlanco et al (2014). The year-2030 emission levels
estimated to result from the current pledges are fromUNEP (2014). Vertical ranges show the statistics per window of 5GtCO2-eq,
starting at 25GtCO2-eq. If less than 10 scenarios are available in for a givewindow and a give temperature goal, only theminimum-
maximum range is provided. If only one value is available, this value is indicated by a single diamond. The inﬂuence of near-term
Kyoto-GHG emissions on the timing of net global Kyoto-GHG emissions and unabatedCO2 from energy and industrial sources
becoming zero is shown in supplementary ﬁgures S1 and S2, respectively.
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Table 2. Internally consistent sets of global long-term targets related towarming limits of 1.5 °Cand 2 °C.Overview of cumulative total CO2 emissions from2011 to 2100, as well as the time of CO2 emissions from energy and industrial
sources, the time of total global CO2 emissions, the time of total global Kyoto-GHGemissions becoming net zero. Additionally, an indication of the inﬂuence of currently projected near-term (2030) emission levels in linewith the country
pledges (UNEP 2014) (56–59GtCO2-eq/yr) is provided based onﬁgure 5. Values are derived fromour full scenario ensemble.
Timing of reaching net zero levels (yeara)
Cumulative CO2 emissions
a from
2011–2100 (GtCO2)
CO2 from energy and industrial
sourcesb Global total CO2 Kyoto-GHGs
Inﬂuence of currently projected near-term (2030) emission levels in linewith
country pledges
Global temperature goal
Limitingwarming to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels with amedium (50%–66%) chance in 2100
1140 [1110–1150] (985–1500) 2080 [2070–2090] (2060–2100) 2070 [2065–2075]
(2060–2100)
2100 [2095–2100]
(2085–2100)
Current pledges imply net zero global CO2 emissions earlier than the inter-
quartile range (i.e., between 2060 and 2065)
Limitingwarming to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels with a likely (>66%) chance in 2100
790 [470–1085] (225–1165) 2065 [2060–2080] (2045–2100) 2065 [2060–2075]
(2045–2085)
2090 [2080–2100]
(2065–2100)
Current pledges imply net zero global CO2 emissions at lower end of the
interquartile range (between 2060 and 2070), but only very few feasible sce-
narios are available in this case.
Returningwarming to below 1.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels with a>50% chance in 2100
365 [275–425] (70–500) 2055 [2050–2065] (2045–2070) 2055 [2050–2055]
(2045–2060)
2080 [2070–2085]
(2060–2085)
No scenarios available from2030 levels implied by current pledges. Pledges
should be strengthened to achieve at least a 20% reduction from2010 levels
(i.e., 2030GHG levels of about 40GtCO2-eq/yr)
a Rounded to nearest 5GtCO2 or nearest 5 year—format:median [interquartile range] (5th to 95th percentile range).
b Referring to unabatedCO2 emissions from energy and industrial sources—see table 1.
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Finally, we look at this question from the opposite
perspective: what is the range of temperature out-
comes consistent with a global net zero CO2 emissions
target year? Figure 3 shows that while the large major-
ity of scenarios that achieve global carbon neutrality in
the 2060–2075 period keep median warming in 2100
below 2 °C, this is not a sufﬁcient condition. The total
amount of emissions emitted until the moment of
reaching carbon neutrality and the amount of non-
CO2warming at that point (Rogelj et al 2015), also play
an additional role.
6.Near-termdelay implies earlier net zero
carbon
Relatively higher emissions in the near term require
more rapid reductions and lower emissions afterwards
(Collins et al 2013, Knutti and Rogelj 2015). This
trade-off implies that, for a given CO2 budget, net zero
levels are reached earlier in time if mitigation is
delayed. Figure 1(c) illustrates the relationship
between the timing of when global CO2 emissions
peak and the resulting years in which net zero CO2
emissions would need to be achieved. Our analysis
shows for example that for CO2 budgets in the
930–1180 GtCO2 range, a delay of two decades in the
peak in global CO2 emissions would imply the need to
reach net zeroCO2 emissions about 15 years earlier.
Not only the timing of the global peak in emissions
inﬂuences when net zero CO2 emissions are achieved,
also the level at which emissions peak plays a role.
Figure 4 illustrates this for CO2 emissions budgets of
930–1180 GtCO2, roughly consistent with a global
warming limit of 2 °C (table 2). Both for near-term
CO2 and Kyoto-GHG emission levels (in the years
2020 and 2030), a clear relationship with the timing of
global CO2 emissions becoming net zero is found.
For instance, to stay within the speciﬁed CO2
emission budget, year-2030 CO2 emission levels of
about 45 GtCO2 correspond to global CO2 emissions
reaching net zero levels around 2065 (median esti-
mate, 10th–90th percentile range of 2060–2070).
Lower 2030 CO2 levels of about 25 GtCO2 would cor-
respond to reaching net zero CO2 later, around 2080
(10th–90th percentile range of 2070–2090). As emis-
sion levels of CO2 and non-CO2 gases are coupled—if
not because they are emitted by the same technologies
then through policy mechanisms under the UNFCCC
—a similar trade-off between near and long term can
be found for Kyoto-GHGs. Both later and higher
peaking thus implies higher emission reduction rates
(Rogelj et al 2013a, IPCC2014b).
Finally, we apply these insights to our tempera-
ture-based scenario subsets (table 2) in order to better
understand the uncertainties in the timing of CO2
emissions becoming net zero. Later peaking con-
sistently advances the timing of reaching net zero total
CO2 emissions given a speciﬁed CO2 budget. This
relationship also exists in the subsets of 1.5 °C and
2 °C consistent scenarios. For instance in scenarios
that limit warming to below 2 °C with 50%–66%
chance, for each 10 GtCO2-eq/yr that emissions are
lower in 2030, the time of achieving net zero total CO2
emissions is delayed by about a decade (ﬁgure 5).
Without a further strengthening over the coming
years, current pledges would imply that global net zero
total CO2 emissions need to be reached between 2060
and 2070 for achieving a 50%–66% chance of staying
below 2 °C (ﬁgure 4 and S2). Kyoto-GHG emissions
would decline to net zero at around 2090 (ﬁgure S1).
In contrast, having already embarked onto a long-
termmitigation pathway by 2030 (with emission in the
35–40 GtCO2-eq/yr range), would postpone the tim-
ing of net zero CO2 emissions by between 15 to more
than 30 year.
However, ﬁgure 5 also shows that for 1.5 °C con-
sistent scenarios and scenarios limiting warming to
below 2 °C with>66% chance this relationship is less
clear. The underlying reasons for this are limitations of
the scenario sampling in the IPCC scenario database
and hence also of our scenario ensemble (methods).
Only a limited number of scenario studies is available
for those ambitiousmitigation scenarios and the avail-
able scenarios and models do not sample near-term
developments evenly (ﬁgure 5). Furthermore, cumu-
lative carbon budgets tend to decrease together with
the near-term evolution of emissions (ﬁgure S3).
Although the timing of net zero CO2 emissions is
generally moved forward with higher near-term emis-
sions given a ﬁxed CO2 budget, this trade-off is thus
less visible in the two most stringent scenario subsets
because also the CO2 budget is generally reduced in
our scenarios. Incidentally scenarios with higher 2030
emissions and a 66% chance of limiting warming to
below 2 °C are also generated by a different subset of
models than those at the lower end, but this only inﬂu-
ences the timing to a small degree (ﬁgure S4). These
insights highlight the critical importance of verifying
possible biases in scenario re-analysis arising from
uneven sampling in ensembles of opportunity.
Furthermore, with increasing near-term emis-
sions, models will also ﬁnd it increasingly difﬁcult to
keep emissions within given cumulative emissions
budgets up to the point that no feasible solutions can
be produced (Rogelj et al 2013a, IPCC 2014b). Infea-
sible scenarios are often not reported (Tavoni and Toll
2010). This results in very few available scenarios for
the lowest temperature levels (1.5 °C) and the highest
probabilities (>66%) in case year-2030 Kyoto-GHG
emission levels exceed 45 GtCO2-eq/yr. At 2030 emis-
sion levels below 45 GtCO2-eq/yr, also returning
warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100 would remain an
option—entailing, however, net zero total CO2 emis-
sions at around 2045–2060.
Finally, besides the level of near-term emissions,
the uncertainty in the timing of global CO2 becoming
zero can be inﬂuenced by the CO2 pathway, the
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potential for negative emissions, and the non-CO2
mitigation potential. However, the unstructured nat-
ure of our scenario set, does not allow for a robust ana-
lysis of these issues.
7. Conclusions
Global net zero emission targets are scientiﬁcally clearer
deﬁned than neutrality concepts, which require addi-
tional deﬁnitions. CO2-related targets (like net zero
carbon emissions or full decarbonization) have a
compelling direct link to the ﬁnding of climate science
on CO2 budgets—the most important anthropogenic
radiative forcing agent. These CO2-related targets can
complement targets on the broader Kyoto-GHG
emissions basket, so that contributions of non-CO2
gases to climate change are also brought under
control.
Net zero emission targets (including full dec-
arbonization) are useful focal points (Jaeger and Jae-
ger 2010) for policy, providing a link between
technologically feasible socio-economic pathways and
a long-term limit on cumulative CO2 emissions. From
a climate point of view, capped cumulative CO2 emis-
sions remain the highest priority for temperature sta-
bilization. Emissions in every year contribute to this
CO2 budget, and delaying mitigation over the coming
decades increases the pressure to achieve net zero CO2
emissions earlier in this century. Once global net zero
CO2 emissions are achieved, also the cumulative CO2
budget will be effectively capped.
Finally, internally consistent sets of global long-
term goals emerge from our re-analysis: for each glo-
bal temperature target, a set of CO2 budgets, near-
term (2030) global emission levels and a year range for
achieving net zero total CO2 emissions can be speciﬁed
(table 2). This information can help policymakers to
verify the internal consistency and scientiﬁc integrity
of the on-goingUNFCCC climate negotiations.
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